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Article 7

LOUISIANA
Keith B. Hall†
I. CASES
A. Use of Citizen Suits to Pursue Legacy Litigation1
In Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P.,2a landowner filed suit seeking
remediation of contamination arising from oil and gas activities prior
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V6.I3.7
†
Campanile Charities Professor of Energy Law, Director of Mineral Law Institute,
1 East Campus Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808, khall@lsu.edu. This paper
discusses legislative and judicial developments relevant to Louisiana oil and gas law
for the first three quarters of 2019.
1. In Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So.3d 234, 238 n.1 (La. 2010), the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated: “Legacy litigation” refers to lawsuits in which
“Legacy litigation” refers to hundreds of cases filed by landowners seeking damages
from oil and gas exploration companies for alleged environmental damage in the
wake of this Court’s decision in Corbello v. Iowa Production, 850 So.2d 686 (La.
2003). These types of actions are known as “legacy litigation” because they often
arise from operations conducted many decades ago, leaving an unwanted “legacy”
in the form of actual or alleged contamination. (citing Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy
Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL. ENVT. L.J. 347, 34 (Summer 2007)).
2. Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P., 2019 WL 1230944 (W.D. La.).
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to his purchase of the property. The landowner previously had filed a
suit seeking a clean-up based on the defendants’ obligations under the
Louisiana Mineral Code. That earlier suit was dismissed based on the
subsequent purchaser doctrine.3 The subsequent purchaser doctrine
states that private claims for damages to property belong to the person
who owned the property at the time of the damages and absent that
person’s assignment of his claims to a subsequent purchaser of the
property, the subsequent purchaser does not have a claim against the
person who caused the damages.4
In the current suit, the landowner seeks injunctive relief—in
particular, an order requiring a remediation—in a citizen suit brought
pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:14 and 30:16. Revised
Statute 30:14 states in part:
Whenever it appears that a person is violating or is
threatening to violate a law of this state with respect to
the conservation of oil or gas, or both, or a provision of
this Chapter, or a rule, regulation, or order made
thereunder, the commissioner shall bring suit to
restrain that person from continuing the violation or
from carrying out the threat.
***
In this suit, the commissioner may obtain injunctions,
prohibitory and mandatory, including temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, as the
facts warrant ***
Louisiana Revised Statute 30:16 states:
If the commissioner fails to bring suit within ten days
to restrain a violation as provided in La. R.S. 30:14,
any person in interest adversely affected by the
violation who has notified the commissioner in writing
3. Guilbeau v. 2 Hess Corp., Inc., 854 F.3d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 2017).
4. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So.3d 246 (La. 2011)
(the leading case on the subsequent purchaser doctrine). If the damage was apparent
at the time of sale, the purchaser presumably negotiated for a lower sales price. Eagle
Pipe, So. 3d at 275 (“it is assumed the apparent damage would result in a loss of
value to the sale, the subsequent purchaser may have a claim in redhibition against
the seller.”).
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of the violation or threat thereof and has requested the
commissioner to sue, may bring suit to prevent any or
further violations, in the district court of any parish in
which the commissioner could have brought suit. If the
court holds that injunctive relief should be granted, the
commissioner shall be made a party and shall be
substituted for the person who brought the suit and the
injunction shall be issued as if the commissioner had at
all times been the complaining party.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that these citizen suit
provisions are designed only to combat ongoing and threatened
violations of the conservation laws, not to provide a remedy for past
violations. Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes issued a report rejecting
that argument and recommending that the court deny the motions to
dismiss. In his report, he relied in part on the Louisiana First Circuit’s
decision in Global Marketing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms,
Inc.5 In addition, the Magistrate’s report cited a footnote in the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. In
that footnote, the Court stated in dicta:
We note that one of the reasons we granted this writ
was to determine whether a subsequent purchaser has
the right to sue for property damages that occurred
before he purchased the property, particularly where
the damage was not overt. However, we need not reach
that determination in this case because, assuming the
Breauxs had a right as a subsequent purchaser to sue in
tort for property damage, that right has prescribed.
Further, we note that regardless of who has standing to
pursue claims for money damages, the current owner
of property always has the right to seek a regulatory
cleanup of a contaminated site. La. R.S. 30:6(F); La.
R.S. 30:16.6
5. Global Marketing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Blue Mill Farms, Inc., 2018-0093 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 11/6/2018), 2018 WL 5816971. That decision, by a divided First Circuit
panel, denied the defendants’ exception of no cause of action.
6. Marin, 48 So.3d at 256 n. 18.
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Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P.7 is almost identical to Guilbeau, which
is discussed immediately above. In Tureau, a landowner filed suit
seeking remediation of contamination arising from oil and gas
activities prior to his purchase of the property. The landowner
previously had filed a suit seeking a clean-up based on the defendants’
obligations under the Louisiana Mineral Code. That earlier suit was
dismissed based on the subsequent purchaser doctrine.8 In the current
action, the landowner seeks injunctive relief—an order requiring a
remediation—in a citizen suit brought pursuant to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:14 and 30:16. The defendants filed motions to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that
these citizen suit provisions are designed only to combat ongoing and
threatened violations of the conservation laws, not as a remedy for past
violations. Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes issued a report rejecting
that argument and recommending that the court deny the motions to
dismiss.
B. Lease Royalty Dispute
1. Lease Basing Royalties on Market Value at the Well, While
Making Lessee Responsible for Most Production Costs, was
Ambiguous
In AWT Be Good LLC v. Chesapeake, L.P.,9 AWT Be Good
LLC granted an oil and gas lease, which provided that except when
natural gas was sold at the well, the royalty on gas would be based on
the market value at the well. A few months later, the lease was
assigned to Chesapeake Louisiana. In 2010, the parties amended the
lease. The amendment provided that the lessee would be responsible
for many post-production costs but not “long-haul transportation
charges to the point of sale of the royalty gas.” Later, AWT brought
suit, asserting that Chesapeake was improperly charging AWT with a

7. Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 2019 WL 1230976 (W.D. La.)
8. Tureau v. 2 H, Inc., 2016 WL 4500755 (W.D. La. 2016).
9. AWT Be Good LLC v. Chesapeake, L.P., 2019 WL 177946 (W.D. La. 2019).
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portion of pipeline capacity charges when Chesapeake did not use the
entire pipeline capacity that it reserved.
Both sides moved for summary judgment, but the court held
that neither side was entitled to summary judgment. The court
concluded that the lease was ambiguous for multiple reasons. For
example, the lease did not make it clear what constituted “long-haul
transportation charges.” Further, the parties had amended the lease to
make the lessee responsible for many types of post-production costs,
but the parties had not amended the portion of the royalty clause that
provided that the royalty on gas will be based on the market value at
the well, even though “market value at the well” implies that the
parties will each bear a share of post-production costs. Additionally,
neither party has submitted summary judgment evidence sufficient to
make it clear exactly how Chesapeake’s contracts with the pipeline
companies worked or how Chesapeake determined the amount of
capacity charge that would be allocated to AWT.
2. Letters Informing Lessees of Change in Lessor and Requesting
Reissuance of Past Royalty Checks were Not Sufficient to Constitute
a Mineral Code article 137 Notice
Louisiana Oil & Gas Interests, LLC v. Shell Trading (U.S.)
Co. was a royalty dispute. Properties-General LLC owned the
lessor’s interest under an oil and gas lease held by Shell Trading and
Gulfport Energy. Properties-General transferred its interest to
Louisiana Oil & Gas Interests, LLC in late December 2013.
On January 17, 2014, Louisiana Oil & Gas sent a letter to Shell
requesting that future royalty checks be made payable to it. Within a
few days, Shell responded with an email requesting that Louisiana Oil
& Gas provide Shell with a copy of a recorded document in which
Properties-General transferred its interest to Louisiana Oil & Gas.
On February 21, 2014, Louisiana Oil & Gas recorded a copy
of the document effecting the transfer into the conveyance records of
Cameron Parish, but months went by without Louisiana Oil & Gas
sending a copy of the document to Shell. Shell continued to issue
royalty checks made out to Properties-General. According to
10

10. Louisiana Oil & Gas Interests, LLC v. Shell Trading (U.S.) Co., 2019 WL
1768296 (W.D. La.).
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Louisiana Oil & Gas, it shared an owner with Properties-General, and
for a while, Louisiana Oil & Gas’s bank had allowed the company to
deposit the checks, even though the checks were made out to a separate
company. However, Louisiana Oil & Gas later changed banks, and
the new bank would not let the company deposit the checks.
On April 21, 2015, Louisiana Oil & Gas faxed to Shell a
certified copy of the document transferring the interest and showing
that the document had been filed in the conveyance records.
On April 23, 2015, Louisiana Oil & Gas returned to Shell two
checks that were made out to Properties-General. Louisiana Oil &
Gas requested that the two checks be reissued to it. Each of the checks
was dated prior to the April 21 fax.
On June 1, 2015, Shell reissued the two checks.
On September 1, 2015, Louisiana Oil & Gas sent a demand to
Shell requesting payment of damages pursuant to Louisiana Mineral
Code article 31:140.
Shell and Gulfport filed Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, and
Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay issued a report recommending that the
motions be granted. She noted that under Mineral Code article 137,
before a lessor asserts a claim for the underpayment, nonpayment, or
late payment of royalties, the lessor must give the lessee written notice
of such failure and wait thirty days. The remedy for which a lessor
who brings suit and proves he was not properly paid depends on the
lessee’s response to the required written notice that the lessee has not
properly paid royalties.
Here, the January 17, 2014 letter could not constitute a notice
of failure to properly pay royalties because the letter addressed future
royalties, not past royalties that had not been timely and properly paid.
Further, the plaintiff’s April 23, 2015 fax did not actually allege that
royalties had not been properly and timely paid. The letter requested
that the checks be reissued, but that request fell short of an assertion
that the royalties had not been properly paid. Accordingly, Louisiana
Oil & Gas never sent a Mineral Code article 137 demand before Shell
paid the royalties with its June 1, 2015 check.
C. Meaning of “minerals” in Instrument Creating Servitude—
Servitude that Applied to “all forms of minerals” Applied to Clay
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In Citrus Realty, LLC v. Parker,11 the defendants owned an
undivided 10% in certain land in Plaquemines Parish. They sold their
10% ownership interest to Citrus but reserved a mineral servitude.
The act of sale reserved the defendants’ rights relating to “all forms of
minerals, including oil gas” but provided that the defendants would
have no surface use rights. However, they could “explore for minerals
by offsite directional drilling or other means not involving the surface
of the property.” White Oak Realty later acquired ownership of the
90% interest in the land not owned by Citrus.
White Oak and Citrus later began to conduct clay mining
operations on the land. The defendants asserted their right to a portion
of the proceeds, pursuant to their servitude for 10% of all minerals.
Citrus filed an action for a declaratory judgment that the defendants’
servitude did not extend to the clay. White Oak later joined the suit as
an additional plaintiff.
The plaintiffs argued that the language in the act of sale that
barred the defendants from using the surface was intended to limit the
servitude to minerals that can be produced by directional drilling. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and
the defendants appealed. The appellate court reversed, rejecting the
argument that the restriction on surface use also had the effect of
limiting the minerals to which the servitude applied. The appellate
court reasoned that the reservation of a right to “all forms of minerals”
applied to clay.
The appellate court also noted that certain additional
justifications given by the trial court for its judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs were simply erroneous. For example, the trial court had
reasoned that because prescription of nonuse is only interrupted by
operations conducted by the servitude owner or someone operating on
the servitude owner’s behalf, a servitude owner is not entitled to a
share of production from someone else’s operations. This is clearly
wrong. As noted by the appellate court, the provision in the Mineral
Code that prescription of nonuse is only interrupted by operations
conducted by the servitude owner (or someone operating on his
behalf)12 has no bearing on the servitude owner’s right to a share of
production.
11. Citrus Realty, LLC v. Parker, 2018-516 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/2019), 2019
WL 385194 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2019).
12. LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:42 (2000) (“Except as provided in Articles 44 through
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Therefore, the appellate court reversed the summary judgment
granted in favor of the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the district
court.
D. Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act Does Not Create Personal
Obligation
In Quality Production Management, LLC v. ConocoPhillips
Co.,13 Quality Production Management filed suit against
ConocoPhillips and BHP Billiton Petroleum. Quality alleged that
ConocoPhillips and BHP are the owners of certain wells off the coast
of Vermilion Parish. At the request of Rooster Petroleum, the operator
of record for the wells, Quality performed work and provided
materials for which it was owed about $90,525.71, along with interest
and reasonable attorneys fees, but Rooster went into bankruptcy.
Quality asserted a privilege, pursuant to the Louisiana Oil Well Lien
Act (“LOWLA”)14 and sought a money judgment against
ConocoPhillips and BHP. Those defendants moved to dismiss the
claims for a money judgment against them, asserting that there was no
privity of contract between them and Quality, and that LOWLA does
not create personal liability. Rather, LOWLA provides in rem liability
only against the wells and leases on which a claimant performs work
or provides material or equipment. Magistrate Judge Whitehurst
agreed and issued a report recommending dismissal of the portion of
Quality’s claim that seeks to impose personal liability against
ConocoPhillips and BHP.
E. Prescription of Nonuse: Creation of Unit with Shut-In Well
Capable of Production in Paying Quantities Interrupts Prescription
of Nonuse for Mineral Royalty Even Though Production Test was a
Different Type Test Than Necessary to Satisfy Regulations
52, use of a mineral servitude must be by the owner of the servitude, his
representative or employee, or some other person acting on his behalf.”) Title 31 of
the Louisiana Revised Statutes is known as the “Louisiana Mineral Code.” The
provisions of the Mineral Code may be cited as “articles” of the Code or as
“sections” of Title 31 of the Revised Statutes. LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:1 (2000) (“Thus
Article 30 of the Louisiana Mineral Code may also be referred to or cited as R.S.
31:30.”).
13. Quality Production Management, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2019 WL
516125 (W.D. La.).
14. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:4863 (2007).
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George M. Gilmer, Jr. granted a mineral royalty to Regal
Energy, L.L.C. covering land in DeSoto Parish on April 1, 2018.15
The instrument granting the royalty provided that the royalty would
be subject to a three-year prescriptive period, but that the presence of
a shut-in well would “perpetuate the term” of the royalty.
XTO Energy, Inc. drilled a well (the “Brown Well”) on the
property and (through an oilfield service company) performed an
open-flow surface production test in late January 2009, flaring natural
gas during the test. The test showed that the Brown Well was capable
of producing gas in paying quantities. The Brown Well became the
unit well but was shut-in because of the lack of a pipeline. On April
30, 2011, Chesapeake Operating, Inc. established production from an
alternate unit well.
Gilmer filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
mineral royalty had terminated by prescription of nonuse16 before that
production began. Gilmer contended that production from the Brown
Well did not interrupt prescription because the hydrocarbons produced
during the test of the well were flared, not saved and used. He also
noted that production from Chesapeake’s alternate well did not start
until more than three years after the royalty was created.
Relevant Mineral Code provisions include articles 87, 88, 90,
and 91. These provide:
Min. Code art. 87. Production as interruption of
prescription; commencement of prescription anew
Prescription of nonuse running against a mineral
royalty is interrupted by the production of any mineral
covered by the act creating the royalty. Prescription is
interrupted on the date on which actual production
begins and commences anew from the date of cessation
of actual production.

15. Gilmer v. Principle Energy, L.L.C., 52,281 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/2018), 256
So. 3d 1139.
16. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3448 (2007) (stating that “Prescription of nonuse is
a mode of extinction of a real right other than ownership as a result of failure to
exercise the right for a period of time.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:27 (2000) (listing
“prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years” as one mode of extinction for
mineral servitudes).
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Min. Code art. 88. Saved production sufficient to
interrupt prescription
To interrupt prescription it is not necessary that
minerals be produced in paying quantities but only that
they actually be produced and saved.
Min. Code art. 90. Tested shut-in well as
interruption of prescription
When there exists on a tract of land burdened by a
mineral royalty, or on a conventional or compulsory
unit that includes all or part thereof, a shut-in well
proved through testing by surface production to be
capable of producing minerals in paying quantities,
prescription is interrupted on the date production is
obtained by such testing. If only a part of the tract
burdened by the royalty is included in a unit and the
unit well is on land other than that burdened by the
royalty, the interruption of prescription extends only to
that portion of the tract burdened by the royalty
included in the unit. Prescription commences anew
from the date on which the well is shut in after such
testing.
Min. Code art. 91. Unitization with tested shut-in
well; effect as interruption of prescription
If the land or part thereof, burdened by a mineral
royalty is included in a conventional or compulsory
unit on which there is a well shut in prior to the creation
of the unit, located on other land within the unit, and
capable of producing in paying quantities as required
by Article 90, prescription is interrupted on and
commences anew from the effective date of the order
or act creating the unit.
The trial court held that, because production was not saved
during the testing of the Brown Well, prescription was not interrupted
pursuant to article 90. However, the court held that prescription was
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interrupted, pursuant to article 91, when the Brown Well was named
the unit well. The district court rejected Gilmer’s argument that
because XTO had not conducted a type of production test required
under Office of Conservation regulations,17 the production test had not
counted for purposes of Mineral Code article 91.
The Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
summary judgment dismissing Gilmer’s suit. The appellate court
basically followed the reasoning of the trial, stating its conclusion that
because hydrocarbons were not saved during the production test, the
test did not interrupt prescription pursuant to Mineral Code articles 87
or 90.18 On the other hand, pursuant to article 91, “prescription was
interrupted on, and commenced anew, from the effective date of the
order . . . creating the unit.”19 Like the trial court, the appellate court
rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the testing of the well did not
count for purposes of Mineral Code articles 90 and 91 because of the
operator’s failure to perform the type of test required by certain
regulations.
F. Mineral Code article 206 Obligation Applies to Person Who
Holds Lease at Time It Terminates, Rather Than to All Persons Who
Ever Held Lease
In the early 1970s, the Pardee Company sold several tracts of
land to the predecessor of Weyerhaeuser Co.20 In the sale, Pardee
reserved a mineral servitude over each tract. Pardee granted a mineral
lease covering portions of the land in 2001. The original lessee
assigned the lease to EP Energy E&P Co., which established unit
production for units that included portions of the land. Weyerhaeuser
filed suit asserting that the servitude at issue had terminated by
prescription of nonuse before EP established production.
Weyerhaeuser demanded that several parties, including EP, execute a
recordable act evidencing termination of their mineral rights. EP
declined to do so. Weyerhaeuser filed suit seeking a declaration that
17. One of the regulations governing well testing is LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt.
XIX, § 119 (West, Westlaw through rules pub. in La. Reg. Vol. 45, No. 09, Sept.
20, 2019).
18. Mineral Code article 90 (LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:90) does not explicitly require
that production be saved in order for testing to interrupt prescription.
19. Gilmer v. Principle Energy, 256 So. 3d 1139, 1145 (La. App. 2018).
20. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Pardee Minerals, LLC, 2018 WL 5624312 (W.D. La.).
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the mineral rights had terminated. Weyerhaeuser also sought attorney
fees, pursuant to Mineral Code article 206, because of the defendants’
failure to acknowledge the termination of their mineral rights. The
district court rejected Weyerhaeuser’s claim against EP for attorney
fees. The court interpreted Mineral Code article 206 as imposing a
duty only on the person who owns a mineral right at the time the right
terminates, not on all persons who ever owned the mineral interest.
G. Pooling Issues--Unleased Owner Not Responsible for PostProduction Costs
In Johnson v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP,21 parties disputed
whether the operator of a compulsory drilling unit can charge an
unleased owner with a proportionate share of post-production costs.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
held that such an operator cannot.
Louisiana Revised Statute Section 30:10(A)(2) states, “In the
event pooling is required, the cost of development and operation of the
pooled unit chargeable to the owners therein shall be determined and
recovered as provided herein.” Section 30:10(A)(3) provides that
owners of unleased mineral rights in a tract in a unit are liable, out of
production, for their “tract's allocated share of the actual reasonable
expenditures” incurred by the unit operator in drilling the well and
producing oil or gas. The statute does not expressly address postproduction costs that the operator may incur in handling and
transporting oil or gas prior to selling it.
Nevertheless, unit operators often incur such post-production
costs in handling and arranging the sale of hydrocarbons attributable
to unleased interests, particularly if a unit well produces natural gas.
This occurs because many owners of unleased interests do not make
their own arrangements to sell the portion of gas attributable to the
tracts in which they own interests. In such circumstances, the operator
has authority to sell the gas attributable to the unleased interests,
subject to an obligation to account to the owners of the interests.
Typically, operators choose to exercise that authority because the
alternative of letting an unleased owner’s share of gas accumulate is
not practical.
21. Johnson v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, 2019 WL 1301985 (W.D. La.).
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Post-production costs that operators commonly incur include
expenses for treating and compressing gas and transporting it to the
place of sale. This leads to the question disputed in Johnson. Namely,
if the unit operator sells natural gas attributable to an unleased interest,
is the owner of that interest responsible for a proportionate share of
the post-production costs reasonably incurred by the operator in
handling the gas? In Johnson, the operator (Chesapeake) argued that
it was entitled to charge the unleased owner with a proportionate share
of these costs. Otherwise, the unleased owners would be unjustly
enriched at Chesapeake’s expense.
The court rejected that argument, noting that 30:10(A)(3)
states:
If there is included in any unit created by the
commissioner of conservation one or more unleased
interests for which the party or parties entitled to
market production therefrom have not made
arrangements to separately dispose of the share of such
production attributable to such tract, and the unit
operator proceeds with the sale of unit production, then
the unit operator shall pay to such party or parties such
tract's pro rata share of the proceeds of the sale of
production within one hundred eighty days of such
sale.
Chesapeake argued that the only purpose of 30:10(A)(3) is to
set a deadline for payment, not to govern liability for post-production
costs. The court held otherwise. Section 30:10 does not define “pro
rata share,” but the court concluded that it means a pro rata portion of
gross proceeds from which the operator may subtract only the costs
that Section 30:10 expressly authorizes the operator to recover. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the unleased
owners, holding that Chesapeake may not charge them with a share of
post-production costs.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Co-ownership and Authority to Operate – La. Acts 2019, No. 350
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When more than one person owns a working interest in the
same land, a question sometimes arises regarding what level of
consent is needed to authorize oil and gas operations.22 In other words,
do operations require the consent of all persons who own a working
interest?
The answer to this question is: “It depends.” The existence of
multiple working interest owners can arise in various ways. The
simplest is when land is co-owned and no mineral servitudes or
mineral leases exist. The Mineral Code does not address this situation,
but Civil Code article 801 states: “The use and management of the
thing held in indivision is determined by agreement of all the coowners.” This has been interpreted as meaning that the consent of all
co-owners of the land generally is required in order to authorize
operations23 with a narrow exception being that Civil Code article 800
allows a co-owner to “take necessary steps for the preservation of the
thing held in indivision” without the concurrence of other co-owners.
Under Mineral Code article 177, a similar rule and similar exception
apply if the land is subject to a mineral lease and the lessee’s interest
is co-owned.
However, different rules apply in three other situations—(1) if
the land is subject to a mineral servitude that is co-owned, (2) the land
is co-owned and one or more, but fewer than all, of the co-owners
grant a mineral servitude, or (3) the land is co-owned or it is subject to
a mineral servitude that is co-owned, and one or more (but fewer than
all) of the co-owners grant a mineral lease. In these three situations,
the original version of the Mineral Code required the consent of all
working interest owners, but that requirement has been loosened.24
The first “loosening” occurred in 1986. Acts 1986, No. 1047
amended Mineral Code article 164 to provide that if a co-owner of
land creates a mineral servitude that burdened his interest, the
servitude owner can operate, provided that such owner acquires the
consent of co-owners owning at least an undivided 90% interest in the
land (the fractional interest of the co-owner who created the servitude
22. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 136 So. 1, 2 (La. 1931) (owner of mineral
servitude for one-half of minerals erroneously contended that it needed consent of
landowner); cf. Huckabay v. Tex. Co., 78 So. 2d 829 (La. 1955).
23. Cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 278 (La. 1919); Sun Oil Co. v.
State Mineral Bd., 92 So. 2d 583, 586 (La. 1956); LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:177 (2000).
24. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 31:166, 31:175 (2000).
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should count toward the total amount of consenting interests). The
same legislation amended Mineral Code article 166 to provide that if
a co-owner of land creates a mineral lease covering his interest, the
lessee may operate with the consent of co-owners owning at least an
undivided 90% interest in the land. Finally, the 1986 legislation
amended Mineral Code article 175 to provide that if land is subject to
a mineral servitude and the mineral servitude itself is co-owned, a coowner can conduct operations if co-owners owning at least an
undivided 90% interest consent.
The requirements were loosened further two years later, when
Acts 1988, No. 647 amended Mineral Code articles 164, 166, and 175
to lower the threshold in those three situations from 90% to 80%.
Acts 2019, No. 350 amends Mineral Code articles 164, 166,
and 175 to lower the threshold to 75%.
B. Use of Oilfield Site Restoration Fund for Responding to
Emergencies
Acts 2019, No. 193 amended Louisiana Revised Statute 30:86
to authorize use of money from the Oilfield Site Restoration Fund to
respond to emergencies declared by the Commissioner of
Conservation pursuant to Revised Statute 30:6.1. Act No. 193 also
amends Revised Statue 30:93.1 to provide that if money from the Fund
is used to respond to an emergency, the Commissioner must seek
recovery of those funds from any party that has operated or held a
working interest in the site where the emergency occurs.
C.State Leases—Including a Provision for a Security Interest
Acts 2019, No. 403 provides that the State Mineral and Energy
Board may include a clause that grants a security interest in minerals
produced pursuant to the lease (or lands pooled therewith and
attributable to the leased premises) in state mineral leases issued after
July 31, 2019 to secure the lessee’s obligation to pay lease royalties or
other sums due under the lease.
The motivation for this amendment relates to the fact that
Louisiana law classifies an oil and gas as a type of lease25—in contrast
to the laws of some other states, which do not classify oil and gas
leases as true leases (as the term “lease” is used in landlord tenant
25. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2671 (2019).
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law).26 Therefore, a mineral lessor’s royalty constitutes rent under
Louisiana law.27 Because the lessor’s royalty constitutes rent, the
Mineral Code article 146 “lessor’s lien,” which is designed to secure
the payment of the royalty, may be rendered unenforceable by 11
U.S.C. § 545 when a lessee is in bankruptcy.28 Certain state officials
were concerned that Louisiana needed to find a way to secure payment
of the royalties to which it is entitled under oil and gas leases granted
by the State.29

26. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2003) (“In
Texas it has long been recognized that an oil and gas lease is not a ‘lease’ in the
traditional sense of a lease of the surface of real property.”); In re Topco, 894 F.2d
727, 739 n.17 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The term ‘lease,’ when used in an oil and gas context,
is a misnomer. The estate created by the oil and gas lease is not the same as those
interests created under a ‘lease’ governed by the law of landlord and tenant”);
PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS OIL AND GAS
LAW § 202.1 (“The very name ‘lease’ is unfortunate inasmuch as it tends to give the
impression to the uninformed that the relationship arising between the parties to an
oil and gas lease is the same as that of landlord and tenant under as [sic] common
law lease of land, whereas except in Louisiana, the dissimilarities are more important
than the similarities.”).
27. LA. STAT. ANN. § 31:123 (2000).
28. See e.g., In re WRT Energy Corp., 169 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 1999).
29. The author served on a committee appointed by the Louisiana Law Institute,
at the request of the Louisiana legislature, to address this issue.

